Medieval Spains: Seville

Introduction
01: Ibn Khaldun

02: AlmoravidsParty KingsZallagaFuqahaAdministrationNorth Africa

03: Sufism

04: AlmohadsIbn TumartTawhidCultureInstitutionsLas Navas de Tolosa

05: LegitimacyCaliphateAlmoravidAlmohad

SEVILLE
Introduction


In the twelfth century, Seville emerged as the preeminent city of al-Andalus, eclipsing Cordoba, whose fortunes declined along with those of the Umayyad dynasty. Seville did not, however, become the new political capital of al-Andalus. During this period, the center of political power shifted south of the Straits of Gibraltar to the new city of Marrakech, capital of the two empires that ruled over al-Andalus from the late eleventh century to the early 13th: the Almoravids and the Almohads. To understand this florescence of Seville, it is useful to think of the twelfth century as a "long century" (to borrow a phrase from Eric Hobsbawm) stretching from the victory of the Almoravids over Alfonso VI of Leon-Castile in the battle of Zallaqa in 1086 to the defeat of the Almohads by Alfonso VIII of Castile in the battle of Las Navas de Tolosa in 1212. During this long century, a new political dynamic emerged in al-Andalus which gave the Muslims of the Iberian Peninsula a new lease on life by fending off the ever greater encroachment of the Christian states of the north. In the decades preceding this period, the Muslims saw their military predominance in the peninsula evaporate as they began paying protection money to the Christian states. The decades following the defeat of Las Navas de Tolosa witnessed the reduction of al-Andalus to the kingdom of Granada as most of the major urban centers of al-Andalus, including Seville, fell to the Christians.

When the Umayyad state collapsed in the early eleventh century, al-Andalus splintered into a number of smaller states whose rulers came to be known as al-mûluk al-tawâ'if, or, in English the taifa or party kings. The name is a reference to the fact that, despite the frequently pompous titles that they took for themselves, these kings controlled no more than a small territory with the support of their party or faction. Unlike the Umayyads before them, these party kings could not claim descent from the tribe of the prophet Muhammad, the Quraysh, and could therefore not claim to be Caliphs. Their rule had no religious legitimacy and so they were known somewhat pejoratively as mulûk or kings, that is, mere temporal rulers with no divine sanction. To overcome this handicap, many of the party kings claimed to be ruling in the name of an Umayyad prince, Hisham II, who is assumed to have died in 1013. Such claims continued to be made until 1082/83 at which point Hisham II would have been over 120 years old.

It is during this period that Seville first began to emerge as a prominent center of al-Andalus. Cordoba retained much of the prestige that it had garnered over the centuries as the seat of government. However, it suffered considerable damage in the fighting that accompanied the fall of the Umayyads and the agricultural hinterland that had served as its economic base was largely destroyed. The eclipse of Cordoba by Seville is illustrated by the conquest of the former by the latter in 1069/70.

The consequences of factionalism and the party kings' fractious competition for regional power soon became apparent. The drastic reduction of Muslim military power that followed the fall of the Umayyad Caliphate was accompanied by a rising tide of military strength of the Christian kingdoms of the north. In 997, the important pilgrimage destination of Santiago de Compostella was sacked by the Muslims. A mere thirteen years later, Muslims were seeking Christian assistance in their wars against one another and in the years that followed, the Christian states began extracting protection money called parias from the Muslims. From this point to the conquest of Granada and the expulsion of the Muslims from the peninsula, al-Andalus would live under constant threat from the Christians states.

The party kings seemed content enough with this state of affairs and continued to pay the very expensive parias and to fight against one another, often in alliance with Christian states. All of this changed with the conquest of Toledo in 1085 by Alfonso VI of Castile-Leon. This was a shock to the party kings, indeed to all Muslims of al-Andalus. And this was no mere aberration. Alfonso's expansionism continued with the siege of Zaragoza in 1086. In response to this threat, the surviving party kings sent a delegation to request help from the new power in the Islamic West, namely the Almoravid Empire, centered in its newly built capital of Marrakech.

The Almoravids

The emergence of the Almoravid Empire was truly novel in the history of the Islamic West. The region that we know today as Morocco had in the past been a part of other empires. The Fatimid Empire had ruled over this region from their capital in modern day Tunisia in the tenth century and the Umayyad Caliphate of Cordoba had controlled portions of it in the same period. However, the rise of the Almoravids represented the first time that an empire had emerged that was centered in what was known as the Far Maghrib (land of the setting sun).

The region within the Maghrib that gave birth to the Almoravid movement was the last place that anyone would have expected to change the course of the North African, and ultimately Iberian, history. Fez and Sijilmasa stood as important urban centers and yet the Almoravid movement sprang from the far south, from the deserts between the Atlas Mountains and the sub-Saharan African kingdoms of Ghana, Takrur and Mali. The inhabitants of this region were not Arabs but Berbers who lived a nomadic life, herding their flocks from one small, sparse grazing area to another. In this inhospitable environment, men traditionally had covered their faces with veils. Although the veils may have served the purpose of protecting the berbers from sub-saharan sun and sand, this social custom was maintained even after the Almoravids reached al-Andalus. Conspicuous among the Andalusian populace, the Almoravids were called al-mulathimun, or the veiled ones.

The Berber tribes of this region, known as the Sanhaja, had converted to Islam in the ninth century after learning about the religion from merchants passing through their region to trade goods from the north such as salt and textiles for gold. It was these two elements--religion and commerce--that distinguished the Almoravid movement. Islam gave them an ideology around which to form a tribal coalition whereas control of the gold trade gave the movement an economic base. In 1035, a leader of one of the Sanhaja tribes, Yahya ibn Ibrahim, traveled to Mecca on the hajj. He completed his pilgrimage with a sense of the inadequacy of his people's understanding of Islam. Pausing in Qayrawan on his return, Yahya ibn Ibrahim asked a religious scholar there to send one of his students to instruct the Sanhaja in their religion. As no student volunteered to forsake the relative comforts of Qayrawan for a life in the desert, Yahya turned to another scholar residing in the southern Maghrib. One of his students, a Muslim named Ibn Yasin, agreed to accompany Yahya back to the Sanhaga.

Little is known about Ibn Yasin. It seems that, at some point, he had traveled to al-Andalus to study religious sciences. If this is the case, it is indeed ironic that Ibn Yasin moved to an elite cultural center from the desolate periphery of the Maghrib, whereupon returning to the desert he founded a movement that ultimately would rescue al-Andalus from military conquest. Ibn Yasin's initial task was to instruct Yahya ibn Ibrahim's tribe, the Guddala, in the basic percepts of Islam. Instituting a rather brutal regime in the name of Islamic reform, Ibn Yasim did little to endear him to the Guddala. According to one source, he confiscated one third of the wealth of converts and had men beaten for minor infractions. Upon the death of Yahya ibn Ibrahim, Ibn Yasin found a new home among the Lamtuna, another tribe of the Sanhaja. It was from this alliance that the Almoravid movement emerged.

The title Almoravid comes from the Arabic designation of the movement: al-murabitun, which means "battlers" or "those who persevere in fighting." It is a term found in the Quran, and was employed by Ibn Yasin in a conscious effort to model his movement on the early Muslim community of the Prophet Muhammad. Assuming leadership of the Lamtuna, Ibn Yasin launched a campaign to conquer the south of the Maghrib. The Almoravids eventually extended their control to Ghana and Takrur, thus establishing control over the lucrative trade with this area. Although Ibn Yasin was killed in 1059 trying to win new converts to the cause, Almoravid expansion continued under Yusuf ibn Tashfin, the man who would ultimately lead the berbers north to rescue his Muslim brethren in al-Andalus from Alfonso VI. In 1083 ibn Tashfin conquered the last city in the Maghrib that resisted him, Ceuta, with the help of Seville's navy. In 1086, it was his turn to come to the aid of Seville.

The Almoravids in al-Andalus

After the conquest of Toledo, it was clear to the party kings that, unless they appealed to an outside force, their days were numbered. Nonetheless, it was with no small reluctance that the refined rulers of culturally sophisticated al-Andalus turned to the desert pastoralists for military assistance. Al-Mutamid, the ruler of Seville bemoaned his choice between alliance with the Almoravids or conquest by the Christians, saying, "Better to pasture camels than to heard swine." In 1086, the taifa states of Seville, Badajoz, and Granada dispatched a delegation, led by the qâdî or judge of Cordoba and the vizir or minister of Seville, to seek the assistance of the Almoravids. In July of that year, a large Almoravid force crossed the straits of Gibraltar under the leadership of Yusuf ibn Tashfin, marching to Seville and from there to Badajoz. Alfonso VI broke off his siege of Zaragoza and went to confront the Muslim army. The two forces met at a place north of Badajoz known as Zallaqa where Alfonso VI's forces were decisively defeated. Rather than pursue further victory, however, Yusuf ibn Tashfin returned to North Africa, leaving behind a small Almoravid contingent in eastern al-Andalus. The berber leader, like others who succeeded him, held a vested interest in his power base in the Maghrib. North African affairs would always remain the key concerns of both the Almoravids and Almohads and when circumstances there took a turn for the worse, al-Andalus was left to its own devices.

Upon the Almoravids return to North Africa, the balance of power in al-Andalus returned to its former state. Christian kings once again demanded parias and the Muslim taifa rulers were obliged to pay these security taxes. However, when Alfonso VI seized the fortress of Aledo, thus cutting Seville and Granada off from the eastern provinces, a delegation of Andalusian notables implored Yusuf to return once again to the Iberian battlefield. This diplomatic initiative impressed Yusuf ibn Tashfin who, in May-June of 1088, again crossed the straits of Gibralter. In alliance with various taifa states, Yusuf's mission to reclaim the fortress of Aledo was an utter failure, undone by rivalry among the party kings. Aledo remained in Christian hands and Yusuf ibn Tashfin retreated to the Maghrib determined to return the next time not as an ally of the party kings but as the uncontested ruler of al-Andalus.

When Ibn Tashfin did return in 1090, he quickly subjugated the major taifa states of southern al-Andalus. By 1102, all of al-Andalus was under Almoravid control with the exception of Zaragoza, which had been left as a buffer state between the Almoravids and the Christians. With new-found popularity, Yusuf ibn Tashfin and the Almoravids championed their cause with the slogan "The spreading of righteousness, the correction of injustice and the abolition of unlawful taxes." Naturally it was the last portion of this equation that proved to be the most popular among the Andalusi Muslims. In order to maintain lavish palaces and to pay the parias to the Christians, the party kings had been forced to levy heavy taxes on their populations. Indeed, the Almoravids initially abolished all taxes on Muslims but zakât, the alms tax. With the spoils of war, the zakât, the jizya (a tax levied on non-Muslim subjects,) as well as the revenues of the trans-Saharan trade, the Almoravids began the process of state-building.

An important segment of the Andalusi population that the Almoravids counted among their supporters was that of the Muslim legal scholars known as the fuqahâ'. The Almoravids had begun as a religious movement and, even though Ibn Yasin was never replaced as spiritual leader after his death, his successors retained this pious tenor. It was said that the Almoravid sultan, in fact, never made a decision without consulting the fuqahâ'. These jurists, in turn, came to exercise considerable influence over the state, especially in al-Andalus whose affairs they understood better than the desert dwelling Almoravids. Given that members of the fuqahâ' had initially encouraged the Almoravids to supplant the party kings, it was in their interest as well to help the fledgling Almoravid dynasty establish their authority as rulers of North Africa and al-Andalus. Ultimately the fuqahâ' provided a legal ruling or fatwâ that declared the party kings debauched and impious, thereby rendering licit the Almoravids' conquest of their states.

As mentioned above, one weakness of the party kings was that their rule had no religious sanction, a problem that many tried to remedy by claiming descent from a long-dead Umayyad Caliph. The Almoravids, on the other hand, recognized the contemporary Abbasid Caliph in Baghdad as the figure on whose behalf they ruled. Establishing legitimacy was imperative and the Almoravids wasted little time in seeking authorization of their rule from the Islamic world. As early as 1100, a Sevillian religious scholar set out for the Middle East with his son where they procured a document from the Abbasid Caliph which identified Yusuf ibn Tashfin as his deputy in the region.

However, not everyone was satisfied with the Almoravid regime. One disgruntled group was that of the poets who had found patronage in the courts of the party kings. With the arrival of more austere and non-sensualist Almoravids, they found themselves out of a job. One of them, Abû Bakr ibn Bakî, wrote, "Since al-Andalus rejects me, I shall flee to Iraq, and, there, everyone will rise to greet me. The profession of the intellect has lost all vitality since it is a life embraced only by those of low extraction and vile manners." The second half of the verse refers to the fuqahâ'. More direct attacks on the fuqahâ' accused them of hypocrisy. Abû Ja'far writes: "Hypocrites! You have gained recognition as a wolf who moves in the darkness of the night. The doctrine of Malik has made you masters of the world and you have used the name of `Abd al-Qasim [a compiler of Malikîte law] to gather your riches." Another Almoravid critic was the hapless ruler of Granada, `Abd Allâh ibn Buluggîn. Betrayed by two of his qâdîs or judges, he complains bitterly in a revealing memoir written in exile in North Africa.

Another group that found itself at odds with the Almoravids and the fuqahâ' was the mystics or Sufis. Relations had begun badly when the qadi of Cordoba ordered the burning of an important work of mystical thought in 1109, earning the enmity of Sufis on both sides of the Straits of Gibraltar. Sufi thought and practice eventually gained greater acceptance on the part of the Almoravid fuqahâ'. It is even said that Yusuf ibn Tashfin's successor, Ali ibn Yusuf was a mystic. Relations had never fully recovered after the book-burning incident, however, and when revolts broke out against the Almoravids in the later years of their regime, some of them were led by Sufis.

These revolts began a mere two decades after the Almoravid conquest of al-Andalus. The formula that had made the first Almoravid leadership successful, namely military triumph against the Christians with lower tax burdens on the populace, could not be replicated by subsequent rulers. In the Christian north, two new kingdoms, Aragon and Portugal, emerged alongside Castile-Leon. To make matters worse, beginning in 1121, the Almoravids faced an uprising in the Atlas mountains of the Maghrib by the Almohads, the movement that would ultimately replace them. To meet these additional military expenses, Almoravid leaders imposed new taxes on the populace, a burden that served to fuel what was already Andalusian discontent with Almoravid rule. When Andalusis began to see the Almoravids lose their ability to ensure their security, as illustrated by the conquest of Zaragoza by Aragon in 1118 for example, and found themselves once again paying taxes, they began to lose their tolerance for their maladroit protectors. The Almoravid berbers came to be seen as an unwelcome foreign presence that no longer served its purpose. We must bear in mind that the Almoravids, with their veiled faces, were quite distinct from the Andalusi population.

The first revolt to break out was in Cordoba in 1121. A disturbance on a feast day led to armed conflict between the Almoravid troops and governor of the city and its citizens, led by the fuqahâ'. The Almoravid sultan `Alî ibn Yusûf managed to negotiate a settlement with the qûdâ of the city, Ibn Rushd al-Jadd, the grandfather of the famous Andalusi philosopher (among other things) Averroes. Although some of the fuqahâ' remained loyal to the Almoravids to the end, such as the famous Qâdî `Iyâd, the fact that the jurists of Cordoba turned against the regime shows how far the latter's stock had fallen.

Simultaneously, as the campaign in the Maghrib against the Almohads began to falter, Almoravid resources in al-Andalus were withdrawn to confront the more immediate threat to the regime's survival. The Andalusi sense of insecurity was deepened by an Aragonese campaign in 1125-26 that ravaged the Andalusi countryside. Alfonso I of Aragon sealed this humiliation by going fishing on the Andalusi coast at Motril. Many Muslims suspected that Andalusi Christians, known as Mozarabs, or Arabized Christians, had conspired with the Aragonese in their campaign. In deporting these Mozarabs to North Africa, the Almoravids lost a further source of revenue for the state, the jizya levied on the Christians.

There were some Almoravid successes in the 1130's, notably the defeat of the Aragonese at the battle of Fraga in which King Alfonso I was killed. But as the Almohads increased their hold in the Maghrib, the Almoravid position in al-Andalus became unsustainable. In a desperate attempt to quell uprisings led by Sufi leadership, the Almoravids executed two prominent Sufis of al-Andalus, Ibn Barrajân and Ibn al-`Arîf, in 1141. Three years later, a revolt broke out around the south-western city of Silves led by a man named Ibn Qasî and his followers, the murîdûn, or Sufi disciples. This revolt was followed by revolts in other cities, often led by their qâdîs. Al-Andalus descended into chaos and order was only restored with the arrival of the Almohads a few years later. Seville surrendered to them in 1148.

The Almohads

At first glance, the Almohad movement bears a great resemblance to that of the Almoravids. It was a religious revival movement sparked by a revelatory trip by its founder to the Middle East, the cultural center of Islamic Civilization. Its military power came from a Berber tribe, in this case, the Masmuda of the High Atlas Mountains, and its capital was also Marrakech. However, any Almohad worthy of the name would have bristled at such a comparison. Upon coming to power, the Almohads destroyed many of the architectural achievements of their predecessors, had mosques thoroughly cleansed of "Almoravid impurity," and employed other means, such as minting square coins, in order to signify a break with the preceding epoch. Furthermore, whereas the Almoravids followed the lead of the fuqahâ' in implementing the letter of Islamic law according to the Mâlikî law school, the Almohads had their own ideology. Where the Almoravids sought to work with the religious practice of al-Andalus as they found it, the Almohads attempted to impose new practices, an experiment of some 70 years that ultimately failed.

The founder of the Almohad movement was a man named Ibn Tumart, a Berber from the Sûs region between the High Atlas Mountains and the Anti-Atlas to the south. The Berbers of this region were not nomadic pastoralists like the Sanhaja. Rather, they lived as farmers in villages on barren hillsides overlooking lush, irrigated Mountain valleys. Their only animals were goats, kept for milk, meat and fertilizer. Ibn Tumart remained in his home region until his mid-twenties when, in 1106/7, he traveled to al-Andalus to study religious sciences. Soon after his arrival, he departed once again to seek knowledge in the Middle East, as did many Andalusi religious scholars. Ten years passed, and upon returning to North Africa, Ibn Tumart had a mission: to reform the religious practices of his home region.

Starting in modern day Algeria, Ibn Tumart began to admonish people in public to more strictly observe their faith. He and his followers broke up wine shops, destroyed musical instruments and intervened to attempt to prevent men and women from mixing in public. Eventually he made his way to Marrakech, to confront the Sultan directly and demand reforms. According to Almohad accounts, Ibn Tumart gained an audience and bested the Almoravid religious scholars in debate. The Sultan, `Alî ibn Yusûf, was advised to execute this upstart reformist, but instead the Sultan banished him from Marrakech. Ibn Tumart retreated to the High Atlas Mountains and established himself there as a preacher. He increased his circle of followers and gained the support of some of the Masmuda tribes of the region.

While Ibn Tumart savagely criticized the Almoravids for their custom of veiling, his reforms were primarily defined by specific doctrinal points he espoused. The most important of these was the Almohad doctrine of Tawhid, or unity. An important Islamic belief is the absolute unity of God which constitutes one of the doctrines that sets Islam apart from the Christian belief in the Trinitarian nature of God (The Father, The Son and The Holy Spirit). The theology of Tawhid, though, goes beyond this by denying that God has any attributes that can be identified as separate from his Being. Thus the Almohads came to be known as al-muwahdûn, the Unitarians, which is derived from the word Tawhid and which emphasized their belief in the one essence of God.

Ibn Tumart soon introduced a further significant distinction between his movement and, not only the Almoravids, but also the Malikî religious scholars. That is, he proclaimed in 1121 that he was the Mahdi, a figure in Islamic belief similar to the Messiah in Christianity or Judaism, who would return at the end of time to fill the world with justice. It is widely accepted in Islam that this Mahdi is Jesus Christ, who is seen by Muslims as a prophet in a chain of prophets that ended with Muhammad. Sunni Islam embraces this belief in the Mahdi, but it is Shiite Islam which places particular emphasis on the return of the Mahdi. This has led some scholars to speculate that Ibn Tumart, at some point, came under the influence of Shiite teachings. Ibn Tumart's Mahdi-hood further added to his authority over his disciples.

Shortly after this declaration, Ibn Tumart moved his followers to a fortress in a remote area of the mountains called Tinmal. Operating with Tinmal as a base, the Almohads commenced open warfare with the Almoravids. The Almohads proved single-minded in pursuing their cause and brutal in crushing their opposition. The inhabitants of Tinmal were driven out of their home, and, at one point in 1129-1130, a purge was undertaken in which as many as 30,000 people whose loyalty to the movement was questioned were killed. In 1130, the Almohads mounted an attack on Marrakech, which ended in disaster. Many important members of the Almohad ruling circle were killed and, in an even more devastating blow, Ibn Tumart died shortly afterwards.

These events did not prove to be the crushing blows to the movement that one might expect. Ibn Tumart's death was kept a secret until his successor, `Abd al-Mu`min, could secure his control of the movement. Over the next 17 years, `Abd al-Mu'min outmaneuvered rivals, including Ibn Tumart's brothers, for the leadership of the Almohads. He decisively defeated the Almoravids and conquered Marrakech in 1147. By 1148 most of al-Andalus was under Almohad rule.

`Abd al-Mu'min's title as ruler was no less than that of Caliph. Whereas many of the Party Kings had recognized the Umayyad Caliphs, and the Almoravids had recognized the Abbasid Caliphs of Baghdad, the Almohads claimed the Caliphate for themselves. Thus, in theory, the al-muwahdûn claimed the right to rule over the entire Muslim world. Coins minted during the Almohad regime are telling evidence of this claim to legitimacy. The Almoravids had minted coins in the name of the Abbasids, and some of the Party Kings had minted coins in the name of the Umayyads. In a marked departure from their predecessors, though, the Almohads produced square coins which bore the inscription, "God is our Lord, Muhammad is our Prophet, the Mahdi is our Leader." Thus, even when holding the office of Caliph, the Almohads recognized the Mahdi as the source of their legitimacy. Indeed, Almohad leadership went so far as to train a new cadre of religious scholars, known as the talba (sing. tâlib), in the teachings of Ibn Tumart with the intent of supplanting the Mâlikî law school. The strategy proved unsuccessful, but it illustrates the extent to which the Almohads saw themselves as a revolutionary break with the past.

The Almohads in al-Andalus

The Almohad period in al-Andalus was characterized by cultural fluorescence and by military campaigns that were sporadic and not as effective as they could have been. The Almoravids had been content to leave affairs in al-Andalus largely in the hands of trusted lieutenants who had wide powers for independent actions. Almohad initiatives, in contrast, seemed to be undertaken, on the main, only when the Caliph was present. Military maneuvers tended to be grandiose affairs, full of pomp and ceremony and accompanied by the distribution of large sums of money, but they frequently lacked the sustained attention required for success. And, once again, when the Caliph was preoccupied with matters in North Africa, al-Andalus was left in the lurch.

`Abd al-Mu'min's successor, Abu Ya`qub Yusuf, was a highly cultivated man who amassed a large library and patronized the arts and intellectual endeavors. In was in his court that the philosopher, Ibn Tufayl, found patronage. It was Ibn Tufayl who introduced the famed Aristotelian philosopher Ibn Rushd, known to medieval Europe as Averroes, to the Almohad court. And it was under the Almohads that the famous Jewish philosopher Musa ibn Maymun, or Maimonides, began his career. Mysticism also flourished in this period which produced one of the most famous Sufis of all time, Ibn al-`Arabi. Architectural projects were also undertaken. Many Andalusi cities had walls built during the latter half of the twelfth century and which can still be seen today. Three distinctive minarets constructed during this period also survive: the Giralda of Seville, The Tour Hassan in Rabat and the Koutoubiyya in Marrakesh.

Despite his cultural sophistication and devotion to the arts, however, Abu Ya`qub Yusuf was not an exceptionally skilled military commander. Many large campaigns were mounted, but they often suffered from low supplies of food and weapons. The Caliph's armies proved largely unsuccessful at taking fortified towns. And, once again, these actions were sporadic, undertaken when the Caliph was present, rather than sustained efforts to retake and hold lost territory. It was during one such poorly executed military campaign against the Portuguese and Aragonese at Huete in 1184 that the Caliph was mortally wounded. His death was kept a secret until the succession of his son, Abu Yusuf Ya`qub al-Mansur, could be arranged.

Al-Mansur, The Victorious, the reign title of the new Caliph, proved to be a more skilled military commander than his father. In 1195, he claimed a major victory over the Castilians at Alarcos, killing large numbers of enemy soldiers. But the triumph highlighted Almohad weakness as well as strength. That the two armies had met in an open plain proved to be a tactical advantage for the Almohad troops. But in order for the Almohads to recapture Christian cities, such as Lisbon or Toledo, Al-Mansur would need to engage in siege warfare as well as use siege engines. The Almohads proved largely incapable of waging such battles.

After his death in 1199, Al-Mansur was succeeded by much less capable Caliphs. It was the first of these, al-Nasir, who led Almohad forces to a disastrous defeat on July 16 of 1212 that sealed the fate of al-Andalus. The battle, known to the Christians as Las Navas de Tolosa, and to the Muslims as al-`Iqâb, thoroughly discredited al-Nasir and may well have been responsible for his assassination the following year. With the defeat at Las Navas de Tolosa, both Almohad will and capacity to mount serious, coordinated resistance against the Christians dramatically diminished. Cordoba fell in 1236 and Seville in 1248. Al-Andalus as it had been known for centuries, a land whose most important cities included Seville and Cordoba and regions such as Valencia, had come to an end.